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Abstract
Since the 1960s, public support for gender egalitarianism has risen substantially in many western countries. Although earlier
research proposed that structural and cultural developments, such as educational expansion, declining religiosity, and the rise of
women’s employment may explain this upward trend, these theoretical speculations have not yet been thoroughly tested. In the
present research, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by empirically analyzing the influence of educational expansion,
secularization, and the rise of women’s labor force participation on support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands and to
explore to what extent these influences differ for men and women. We use repeated cross-sectional survey data from the
Netherlands involving 12,146 men and 13,858 women. To capture cohort and period effects, we include historical and contem-
porary contextual measures of educational expansion, secularization, and female labor force participation obtained from popu-
lation censuses and labor force surveys, covering about 100 birth cohorts and 25 survey years. Of these three indicators,
educational expansion contributed most to the rise in men’s, and particularly women’s, support for gender egalitarianism by
changing the normative societal climate in which men and women have grown up and live. Promoting educational levels may
therefore have far-reaching benefits for gender equality.
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Contextual indicators
Although gender equality has improved throughout the world,
considerable gender-based inequality, discrimination, and exclu-
sion persist (World Economic Forum 2015). Public support for
gender egalitarianism may be an important factor in achieving
gender equality because it contributes to a more egalitarian divi-
sion of work and family responsibilities between partners, and it
increases women’s opportunities, political participation, and la-
bor market outcomes (Corrigall and Konrad 2007; Fortin 2005;
Inglehart and Norris 2003). Gender egalitarianism is referred to
as a belief system that supports equal rights, roles, and responsi-
bilities for men and women and, vice versa, opposes the notion
that men and women have innately different roles (i.e., women
would essentially be more suited for caretaking and homemak-
ing whereas men’s natural role is that of the breadwinner) (Davis
and Greenstein 2009). Since the 1960s, a liberalizing trend to-
ward greater public support for gender egalitarianism has been
found in a wide range of countries, including the United States
(Cotter et al. 2011; Mason and Lu 1988; Thornton et al. 1983),
western Europe (Kraaykamp 2012; Lee et al. 2007; Scott et al.
1996), Australia (Van Egmond et al. 2010), as well as non-
western countries (Inglehart and Norris 2003).
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Theoretically, it is argued that structural and cultural devel-
opments, such as increasing levels of education, declining reli-
giosity, the rise of women’s employment, declining fertility, and
the women’s movement have propelled support for gender egal-
itarianism (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Cotter et al. 2011;
Mason and Lu 1988; Pampel 2011; Scott et al. 1996;
Shorrocks 2016). These developments have supposedly trans-
formed the dominant societal discourse, exposing all individ-
uals, and particularly those in late adolescence and early adult-
hood (the so-called Bimpressionable years^; Sears 1983, p. 81),
to ideas of gender egalitarianism (Inglehart and Norris 2003).
Instead, to explain the upward trend in support for gender egal-
itarianism, previous research has mainly compared levels of
support for gender egalitarianism over time and across different
birth cohorts (so-called period and cohort effects, respectively)
(Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004;
Cotter et al. 2011; Firebaugh 1992; Kraaykamp 2012; Mason
and Lu 1988; Neve 1995; Thijs et al. 2017). However, by using
temporal measures of birth cohort and survey year as broad
indicators of historical and contemporary societal
developments, these studies leave unexplained why people
living and growing up in times of different structural and
cultural circumstances vary in their support for gender
egalitarianism. In their literature review, Davis and Greenstein
(2009, p. 91) concluded that Bseveral researchers have found
period effects, but the impetus for change continues to be
unclear.^ Thus, still surprisingly little is known about the under-
lying determinants of the overall upward trend in support for
gender egalitarianism in the past decennia.
More recently, scholarly attention has been directed to an
apparent slowdown of the trend toward gender egalitarianism
in themid-1990s, also referred to as the stalled gender revolution
(Cotter et al. 2011; England 2010, p. 149–150; Pepin and Cotter
2018, p. 7; Shu and Meagher 2017, p. 1). Since then, studies
have started to take the societal context into account to explain
this stall in gender egalitarianism. For example, Shu and
Meagher (2017) found that increased gender equality in the
labor force partly accounted for the increase in gender attitudes
in the United States in the 1980s, whereas the rise of men’s
overwork appeared to explain part of the slowdown in gender
attitudes in the 1990s as well as a restart of liberal gender atti-
tudes from 2004 onwards. Pepin and Cotter (2018), by contrast,
found that contextual increases in mothers’ education and em-
ployment played a minimal role in explaining American high
school students’ gender attitudes about work and family. Based
on cross-national comparisons, Dotti Sani and Quaranta (2017)
found that adolescents’ gender attitudes are influenced by the
dominant societal discourse on gender inequality, but it remains
to be seen whether this persists over the lifecourse. To our
knowledge, however, no prior study has as yet tested the influ-
ence of important structural and cultural developments in the
societal context during people’s early adulthood on the upward
trend in public support for gender egalitarianism.
In the present research, we aim to contribute to the existing
literature on changes in gender egalitarianism by empirically
analyzing the influence of three theoretically relevant societal
developments—educational expansion, secularization, and
the rise of women’s labor force participation—on support for
gender egalitarianism among women and men in the
Netherlands. Instead of estimating the influence of birth co-
hort and survey year to capture cohort and period effects as
has been done in previous research, we analyze the influence
of contextual measures of these three societal developments
(a) when the respondents were in their late adolescence and
early adulthood (16–20 years-old), and (b) in times of the
survey year, while controlling for age effects and differences
in the composition of the population. We thereby provide a
more thorough test of the previously theorized influence of
educational expansion, secularization, and female labor force
participation on changes in gender egalitarianism over time
and across cohorts (Menard 1991; Rodgers 1990). In addition,
we analyze whether the influence of these structural and cul-
tural developments is gendered because men and women have
different interests in gender equality and may respond differ-
ently to questions about gender egalitarianism (Ciabattari
2001; Jennings 2006).
In the Netherlands, public support for gender egalitarian-
ism has risen substantially to one of the highest levels in
Eu r o p e (Me r e n s a n d Van d e n B r a k e l 2 0 1 4 ) .
Notwithstanding, views on childcare arrangements and re-
sponsibilities seem more ambivalent because women are still
being held primarily responsible for their children and they
spend more time on caregiving than men do (Knijn 1994;
Merens and Van den Brakel 2014; Wiesmann et al. 2008).
We therefore focus on one aspect of support for gender egal-
itarianism that seems of particular interest in the Netherlands
as well as in many other western countries: whether women
are viewed as more suited to raise little children than men are.
Moreover, the Netherlands provides an interesting case be-
cause the Dutch societal and cultural context has vastly
changed since the 1960s. As compared to many other coun-
tries, the Netherlands has been in the vanguard of educational
expansion (Bar Haim and Shavit 2013) and secularization
(Becker and De Hart 2006). In addition, Dutch women’s labor
force participation has increased rapidly, shifting from one of
the lowest in Europe to one of the highest in only a few de-
cades, notwithstanding that the majority of women works
part-time (Merens and Van den Brakel 2014; Pott-Buter
1993). Although other explanations for trends toward gender
egalitarianism have been proposed in the literature, such as
declining fertility or the women’s movement, we focus on
these three developments because these have been very per-
vasive in the Netherlands. The Dutch women’s movement has
been relatively small as compared to the United States.
Moreover, we lack historical data on these contextual indica-
tors during respondents’ emerging adulthood, and
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developments such as the women’s movement are difficult to
operationalize in terms of numbers and impact.
We address the following research question: To what extent
have historical and contemporary contextual indicators of ed-
ucational expansion, secularization, and female labor force
participation contributed to the trend toward stronger support
for gender egalitarianism among men and women in the
Netherlands since 1979? We use nationally representative
cross-sectional data from the Cultural Changes in the
Netherlands surveys between 1979 and 2006.We complement
these data with historical and contemporary indicators of ed-
ucational expansion, secularization, and female labor force
participation collected from the Dutch population censuses
and labor force surveys, covering a timespan of about 100
cohort years and about 25 survey years.
From Micro-Level Theories to Macro-Level
Explanations
Two theoretical approaches are mainly used to explain indi-
vidual variation in support for gender egalitarianism: the
interest-based approach and the socialization or exposure ap-
proach. The interest-based perspective argues that people
adopt and maintain attitudes that are in line with their personal
goals and interests (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). According
to theories of socialization and exposure, people adopt egali-
tarian beliefs when socialized into liberal gender norms or
when exposed to egalitarian ideas about gender (Bolzendahl
and Myers 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003). These perspec-
tives are often employed to explain why women support gen-
der egalitarianism more than men do (Davis and Greenstein
2009). Because women in general continue to have a deprived
position in society as compared to men (Epstein 2007; World
Economic Forum 2015), promoting gender equality benefits
their interests (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Men, by con-
trast, gain less from supporting gender egalitarianism because
it may undermine their dominant position or because they are
simply unaware of their favorable position (Baxter and Kane
1995; Ciabattari 2001). In addition, childhood socialization in
and exposure to egalitarian ideas and contexts are supposed to
impact women more than men (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004;
Dotti Sani and Quaranta 2017), resulting in stronger support
for gender egalitarianism among women.
These individual-level theoretical perspectives, however,
cannot explain changes in support for gender egalitarianism
over time. Previous studies have therefore argued that people’s
interest in and exposure to gender egalitarianism may have
changed due to societal developments that have taken place
during the past decades. For example, it is argued that women’s
interest in gender egalitarianism in society has increased due to
their rising educational levels, declining religiosity, and increas-
ing labor market participation, whichmakes themmore likely to
adopt gender egalitarian views (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004;
Pampel 2011). Yet, the influence of these societal developments
may even spill over to other individuals by shifting the norma-
tive climate to which all individuals, includingmen, are exposed
(Inglehart and Norris 2003).
Historical and Contemporary Societal
Developments
Building on theories of social change, societal developments
could have influenced support for gender egalitarianism in
two ways. First, according to theories of socialization, histor-
ical circumstances and events that people experience during
late adolescence and early adulthood shape their basic values,
attitudes, and worldviews (Jennings and Niemi 1981;
Krosnick and Alwin 1989; Mannheim 1952; Sears 1983). It
is argued that this period between late adolescence and early
adulthood, also referred to as emerging adulthood (Arnett
2000), is a crucial period in people’s lives in which they are
especially impressionable to the social and political context
(Jennings and Niemi 1981; Krosnick and Alwin 1989).
According to Mannheim (1952), people who share the same
year of birth experience similar societal circumstances during
their impressionable years. These so-called cohort effects are
supposed to have a lasting influence on people’s attitudes
throughout the lifecourse (Alwin and McCammon 2003;
Inglehart 1997; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Krosnick and
Alwin 1989; Sears 1983). People who are socialized under
societal circumstances in which egalitarian gender norms pre-
vail may therefore show more support for gender egalitarian-
ism, even at later stages in their lives. Social change then
originates from the natural replacement of older cohorts by
younger cohorts with different experiences and, therefore, dif-
ferent attitudes (Mannheim 1952; Ryder 1965).
A second explanation assumes that people are open to
change throughout the lifecourse and that they alter their atti-
tudes in response to certain events and developments (Alwin
and McCammon 2003). Contemporary societal circumstances
at a certain moment in time, also referred to as period effects,
may expose the entire population equally and simultaneously to
a certain cultural discourse of gender egalitarianism, resulting in
a broad shift in aggregate support for gender egalitarianism from
one period to another (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Drawing on
these theoretical notions of socialization and exposure, we de-
rive predictions on cohort- and period-specific societal develop-
ments in the Netherlands that may have contributed to the up-
ward trend toward gender egalitarianism.
Given the greater interest of women in supporting gender
egalitarianism due to their relatively disadvantaged position,
as well as their supposedly stronger socialization in and expo-
sure to more egalitarian beliefs (Brooks and Bolzendahl
2004), we expect the influence of these societal circumstances
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to be consistently stronger for women as compared to men.
Adopting egalitarian gender norms could benefit women’s
educational and occupational opportunities and may reduce
the double burden of paid labor and family responsibilities
that women often experience (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004;
Van der Lippe and Van Dijk 2001). For example, Dotti Sani
and Quaranta (2017) found that the dominant societal dis-
course on gender equality had a strong influence on young
women’s gender egalitarianism, but not on young men’s.
Educational Expansion
The educational level of the Dutch population has increased
substantially in the last century (Bar Haim and Shavit 2013). It
is argued that education has a liberalizing influence, transmitting
ideas about diversity and equality, countering gender stereo-
types, and increasing individuals’ openness to alternative per-
spectives on the roles of women and men in the public and
private spheres (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Vogt 1997).
Previous research has consistently shown that obtaining a higher
educational level is related to more support for gender egalitar-
ianism (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic
2000). When educational levels rise in society, the likelihood
of interacting with people who endorse more egalitarian gender
attitudes increases. Moreover, educational expansion may shift
the dominant societal discourse regarding gendered roles, sig-
naling a culture shift toward more opportunities for women. As
a consequence, people in their emerging adult years have be-
come socialized into an increasingly egalitarian societal context,
instilling stronger support for gender egalitarianism in these co-
horts. Although Pepin and Cotter (2018) found that contextual
increases in mother’s educational levels in the United States
played a minimal role in explaining changes in adolescents’
gender attitudes, a stronger influence of rising educational levels
may be found when comparing gender egalitarianism across a
larger number of generations. Hence, we propose that the higher
the level of education in society to which people are exposed
during emerging adulthood, the stronger people will support
gender egalitarianism, and this cohort effect will be stronger
for women than for men (Hypothesis 1a).
Contemporary exposure to a highly educated societal con-
text, characterized by a more egalitarian discourse, may also
spill over to other individuals in such contexts, inducing sup-
port for gender egalitarianism among these individuals regard-
less of their own social position. For example, Banaszak and
Plutzer (1993) found stronger support for gender egalitarian-
ism in U.S. regions where women’s educational attainment
approached that of men. To investigate whether this also ap-
plies when comparing different time points instead of regions,
we formulate the following hypothesis: The higher the level of
education to which people are exposed at a specific historical
moment in time, the stronger people will support gender
egalitarianism, and this period effect will be stronger for wom-
en than for men (Hypothesis 1b).
Secularization
Traditional religious institutions have long prescribed and ac-
tively enforced social norms regarding which activities and
behaviors are considered appropriate for men and women,
assigning women a separate and subordinate position in soci-
ety confined to the care for children and household chores
(Inglehart and Norris 2003; Peek et al. 1991). According to
Voas, McAndrew and Storm (2013, p. 264): B[t]he conserva-
tive ethos of religious organizations validates and reinforces
the choice [of a woman] to be a home-maker.^ Over the past
decades, the Netherlands has witnessed a dramatic decline in
church membership, church attendance, and religious beliefs
(De Graaf and Te Grotenhuis 2008). This process of secular-
ization is supposed to have weakened the strength of tradition-
al gender norms, leading people to dissociate themselves from
their prescribed roles as homemakers or breadwinners
(Inglehart and Norris 2003). Previous studies indeed found
higher levels of support for gender egalitarianism among
non-religious individuals (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004;
Thornton et al. 1983; Voicu 2009). With advancing seculari-
zation, people in their emerging adult years are likely social-
ized into an increasingly egalitarian cultural climate, which
may have instilled higher levels of support for gender egali-
tarianism in these cohorts. We thus expect that the higher the
level of secularization in society to which people are exposed
during emerging adulthood, the stronger people will support
gender egalitarianism, and this cohort effect will be stronger
for women than for men (Hypothesis 2a).
Exposure to a context with higher shares of non-religious
people not only may influence support for gender egalitarian-
ism among those in their emerging adult years, but also may
affect all individuals in such context. Comparing differences
in gender attitudes between U.S. states, Moore and Vanneman
(2003) found that people living in states with higher propor-
tions of religious fundamentalists held less egalitarian gender
beliefs. Hence, we expect that the decline of religiosity in
society exposes both religious and non-religious people to
increasingly egalitarian gender norms. We expect that the
higher the level of secularization to which people are exposed
at a specific historical moment in time, the stronger people
will support gender egalitarianism, and this period effect will
be stronger for women than for men (Hypothesis 2b).
The Feminization of the Labor Force
The rise of women’s labor force participation is one of the most
frequently mentioned explanations for the increase in support
Sex Roles (2019) 81:594–609 597
for gender egalitarianism (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Brooks
and Bolzendahl 2004; Cotter et al. 2011; Mason and Lu 1988).
In the Netherlands, women’s participation in the labor force has
increased considerably over the past decades (Merens and Van
den Brakel 2014; Pott-Buter 1993). As a consequence, people
are more likely to interact with working women as family,
friends, neighbors, and colleagues, which may challenge ideas
about a traditional division of paid and unpaid labor as well as
women’s dependency on men, in turn legitimizing alternative
family and childcare arrangements. It is argued that exposure to
working women’s ability to be self-reliant and to perform in the
labor market induces higher levels of gender egalitarianism
(Meuleman et al. 2016). Moreover, societal norms on women’s
capability to work outside the home may be more widespread
when female labor force participation is higher. Particularly for
people during their emerging adult years, socialization in such a
normative climate may have a lasting influence on their support
for gender egalitarianism. Dotti Sani and Quaranta (2017), for
example, showed that adolescents, especially young women,
are more likely to internalize gender egalitarian attitudes in
countries where women are more emancipated and visible in
the public sphere. Yet, the influence of changes in the societal
context within one country over time may differ from variation
between countries. We therefore formulate the following hy-
pothesis: The higher the level of female labor force participa-
tion in society to which people are exposed during emerging
adulthood, the stronger people will support gender egalitarian-
ism, and this cohort effect will be stronger for women than for
men (Hypothesis 3a).
Increased female labor force participation may also influ-
ence people who are not in their emerging adult years, expos-
ing the entire population to a more egalitarian normative cli-
mate. In addition, employed women’s gender egalitarianism
may spillover to other individuals in society, inducing more
support for gender egalitarianism independent from people’s
own employment status. In a cross-national study, André et al.
(2013) indeed found stronger support for gender egalitarian-
ism in countries with higher female labor force participation,
particularly among women. By contrast, Meuleman and col-
leagues (2016) found no such effect, whereas Banaszak and
Plutzer (1993) found regional rates of labor force participation
in the United States to be related to lower gender egalitarian-
ism among non-working women. Focusing on changes over
time instead of differences between countries or regions, Shu
and Meagher (2017) found that contextual changes in
women’s labor force participation in the United States indeed
partly accounted for the rise in support for gender egalitarian-
ism, as well as for the mid-1990s slowdown. Hence, we ex-
pect that: The higher the level of female labor force participa-
tion to which people are exposed at a specific historical mo-
ment in time, the stronger people will support gender egalitar-
ianism, and this period effect will be stronger for women than
for men (Hypothesis 3b).
Method
To test our hypotheses we employed repeated cross-sectional
data from 14 waves of the Cultural Changes in the
Netherlands surveys (CV). These data were collected in
face-to-face interviews between 1979 and 2006 by
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, and Statistics
Netherlands (2016) to monitor opinions about society and
culture among the Dutch population. Each wave consists of
a representative national sample of around 2000 individuals
aged between 16 and 74 years-old.We combined all 14 waves
into one pooled dataset, containing 28,091 respondents. We
enriched these data with contextual data to measure period-
and cohort-specific societal circumstances.
Support for Gender Egalitarianism
Support for gender egalitarianism was measured with the
question: BAwoman is more suited to raise little children than
a man.^ Response categories ranged from 1 (strongly agree)
to 5 (strongly disagree). This question relates to a specific
aspect of the private dimension of gender egalitarianism
(Wilcox and Jelen 1991) and captures a gender essentialist
notion of women and men having innately different interests
and skills, which may guide preferences for a gender-typed
division of roles (Charles 2011). Although gender egalitarian-
ism consists of various dimensions (Davis and Greenstein
2009), other questions on gender egalitarianism in the data
were only available in a more limited number of waves. A
higher score on the dependent variable indicates more support
for gender egalitarianism. We excluded individuals with a
missing value on the dependent variable (n = 756, 2.7%).
Individual-Level Characteristics
The respondents’ gender was measured as (0) male or (1)
female. We operationalized educational attainment as the re-
spondents’ highest educational level followed. We harmo-
nized the educational categories across the waves, resulting
in seven categories of educational attainment ranging from
(1) primary education to (7) university education. To measure
church attendance, respondents were asked how often they
had attended church or any other house of prayer in the past
half year, measured in five categories ranging from once a
week or more (0) to never (4). In addition, we included a
variable indicating whether or not respondents considered
themselves a member of any church or religious community
(0 = yes; 1 = no). To measure employment status, we com-
bined information about the respondents’ socio-economic po-
sition and working hours, based on the commonly used defi-
nition of Statistics Netherlands (Janssen and Dirven 2015;
Kraaykamp 2012), which distinguishes between full-time em-
ployment (more than 35 h a week, coded 0), part-time
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employment (12–35 h working per week, coded 1), and not in
paid employment (0–12 h a week). We grouped respondents
in the latter category into four additional categories based on
information about their socio-economic position: unemployed
(2), household labor (3), pensioned or disabled (4), student (5)
or other (6). We included a variable indicating whether there
are children in the household (0 = no; 1 = yes). Because peo-
ple may become more conservative as they age, we included a
continuous measure of age of the respondent as a control
variable. We excluded missing values on the individual level
characteristics (n = 1021, 3.7%).
Historical and Contemporary Contextual
Characteristics
To measure historical and contemporary societal circum-
stances, we complemented the data with contextual informa-
tion on the average educational level, the share of non-
religious people, and women’s participation in the labor force
at the province level. The Netherlands is divided into 12 prov-
inces, with on average about 1.5 million inhabitants per prov-
ince. Considerable differences among these provinces exist in
the levels and rates of educational expansion, secularization,
and rising female labor force participation. We propose that
circumstances at the province level provide a more direct mea-
surement of socialization or exposure than national-level cir-
cumstances. Moreover, contextual characteristics on the na-
tional level show far less variation.
We measured educational expansion by calculating per
province the average educational level of the cohort that
entered the labor market (Te Grotenhuis 1999), derived
from the Dutch population census 1960 (Statistics
Netherlands 1999) and the Dutch labor force surveys
1992, 1994, 1996, and 2016 (Statistics Netherlands
1987, 2016). Labor force entry was determined by adding
the number of years required to finish a certain education-
al level to a cohort’s birth year (excluding those still in
education). We used the Dutch Standard Education
Classification (SOI), which ranges from 1 (primary
education) to 5 (tertiary education). In 1900 the average
educational level of people who entered the labor market
amounted to 1.06 (SD = .04; M = 1.04, SD = .03, among
women and M = 1.07, SD = .05, among men), which is
just above primary education level (see Fig. 1s in the
online supplement). By 2006, the Dutch educational level
had risen to 3.44 (SD = .18; M = 3.55, SD = .21 among
women and M = 3.33, SD = .21 among men), correspond-
ing to (upper) secondary education. In the early 1990s,
women’s educational level surpassed that of men.
Secularization was measured as the percentage of individ-
uals not belonging to any religious denomination per prov-
ince, derived from the Dutch population censuses from
1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics
Netherlands 1999), the Cultural Changes in the Netherlands
surveys 1970–2006 (The Netherlands Institute for Social
Research and Statistics Netherlands 2016), and the Socio-
cultural Developments in the Netherlands surveys (SOCON)
1979–2011 (Eisinga et al. 2012). Between 1900 and 2006, the
share of non-religious individuals increased from 2.6% (2.5%
among women and 2.3% among men) to 63.0% (59.2%
among women and 67.4% among men) (see Fig. 2s in the
online supplement).
Female labor force participation was measured as the per-
centage of women above 14 years of age who were active in
paid labor in each province, based on the number of women in
an occupation (excluding those who are [temporarily] unem-
ployed, in education, who do household labor, who are unable
to work or who are institutionalized) derived from the Dutch
population censuses from 1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1956,
1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands 1999) and on the number
of women employed for at least 12 h a week retrieved from the
Dutch labor force surveys 1981–2013 (Statistics Netherlands
2014). These statistics do not allow to differentiate between
full-time and part-time employment at the province level. The
share of women participating in the labor force more than dou-
bled from 16.7% in 1900 to 35.4% in 2006 (see Fig. 3s in the
online supplement). However, female labor force participation
only slightly increased in the years before the Second World
War, and even dropped below 15% afterwards. From the late
1950s, women’s participation on the labor market increased
again, but it was not until the second half of the 1980s that
women’s employment really took off.
Societal circumstances during people’s emerging adult
years were operationalized by calculating for each respon-
dent a 5-year average of each of these three indicators
when the respondent was between 16 and 20 years-old.
Although there is no general agreement regarding precise-
ly which are the impressionable years, socialization per-
spectives agree that the period around people’s 18th birth
year is important for the formation of attitudes (Arnett
2000; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Krosnick and Alwin
1989). Hence, we consider the emerging adult years be-
tween 16 and 20 to be an important part of people’s im-
pressionable years. Furthermore, data for younger ages
were not available in the survey. Unfortunately, no infor-
mation about the province in which people were living
during their impressionable years was available.
However, according to Statistics Netherlands, only 17%
of all residential mobility in 2015 was between provinces.
Considering processes of geographical mobility and ur-
banization in the Netherlands, this percentage likely was
lower in the past.
Contemporary societal circumstances that are specific for a
certain time period were operationalized by using the average
values on the indicators of educational expansion, seculariza-
tion, and female labor force participation per province from
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the year preceding the year of the survey (i.e., lagged by one
year). Missing values on the historical and contemporary con-
textual measures were replaced using linear interpolation.
Because one of the Dutch provinces (Flevoland)was established
only in 1986, we lacked information on cohort-specific circum-
stances for people in this province. We excluded respondents
living in this province from our analyses (1.2%), resulting in a
sample size of 26,004 individuals (12,146 men and 13,858
women). Descriptive statistics for the individual and contextual
variables are presented in Table 1.
Analytical Strategy
To test our hypotheses, we estimated OLS regressionmodels for
men and women separately, using historical and contemporary
contextual characteristics as proxies for cohort and period effects
(Menard 1991; Rodgers 1990). For this purpose, we included
continuous measurements of the percentage tertiary-educated
people, the percentage non-religious people, and the percentage
employed women during the respondents’ emerging adulthood
(instead of birth year) to capture cohort effects, and continuous
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of
the dependent and independent
variables
Men (n = 12,146) Women (n = 13,858)
Min Max M SD Min Max M SD
Support for gender egalitarianism 1 5 2.74 1.17 1 5 3.16 1.19
Individual level variables
Age 16 74 42.66 15.85 16 74 41.85 15.46
Educational attainment 3.60
Primary 0 1 .10 0 1 .11
Primary vocational 0 1 .24 0 1 .26
Lower secondary 0 1 .09 0 1 .14
Secondary vocational 0 1 .20 0 1 .20
Upper secondary 0 1 .09 0 1 .11
Bachelor’s or equivalent 0 1 .14 0 1 .12
Master’s or equivalent 0 1 .15 0 1 .08
Church attendance
Once a week 0 1 .15 0 1 .15
Once a fortnight 0 1 .04 0 1 .05
Once a month 0 1 .06 0 1 .06
Less than once a month 0 1 .17 0 1 .18
Never 0 1 .58 0 1 .56
Church membership (no) 0 1 .58 0 1 .55
Socio-economic position
Full-time employment 0 1 .57 0 1 .13
Part-time employment 0 1 .06 0 1 .21
Unemployed 0 1 .04 0 1 .02
Household labor 0 1 .01 0 1 .47
Pensioned 0 1 .21 0 1 .07
In education 0 1 .09 0 1 .07
Other position 0 1 .02 0 1 .03




1.17 3.78 2.58 .57 1.17 3.78 2.61 .55
Cohort-specific secularization .64 76.87 34.60 19.70 .70 76.87 35.28 19.36
Cohort-specific female LFP 11.85 41.42 20.05 4.29 11.85 41.42 20.04 4.29
Period-specific educational
expansion
2.82 3.85 3.26 .22 2.82 3.85 3.26 .21
Period-specific secularization 15.12 77.39 54.96 13.63 15.12 77.39 55.01 13.63
Period-specific female LFP 16.56 38.72 26.99 5.60 16.56 38.72 26.92 5.52
Source of these data is Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979–2006; n = 26,004
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measurements of these developments during the survey year
(instead of survey year itself) to capture period effects. This
method allowed us to estimate the separate influences of three
indicators of important societal circumstances and, moreover, to
provide a more meaningful interpretation of previously pro-
posed theoretical explanations of the rise of public support for
gender egalitarianism over time. All cohort- and period-specific
contextual characteristics were mean-centred, and the values of
the percentage non-religious people and percentage employed
women were divided by 10 to facilitate interpretation of the
unstandardized coefficients. All control variables, including
age, were entered as dummy variables to allow for possible
non-linear relationships with the dependent variable. Because
we expect the influence of all contextual characteristics to differ
between men and women, we analyzed models for men and
women separately. To assess whether the effects for men and
women are significantly different, we used a z-test for the dif-
ference between two regression coefficients, based on the work
of Paternoster et al. (1998).
First, we analyzed the influence of cohort- and period-
specific indicators of educational expansion, secularization,
and feminization of the labor force separately, while control-
ling for a dummified age variable (see Table 1s in the online
supplement). To analyze the influence of each of these devel-
opments net of one another, we subsequently included all
contextual characteristics simultaneously in one model. We
could, however, not obtain reliable estimates due to harmful
multicollinearity resulting from the confounding of the con-
textual characteristics with age. One solution to this conun-
drum is to impose a restriction on the effect of age, that is, we
constrained the effects for all respondents between 16 and
29 years of age to be equal (following the approach of
Firebaugh and Chen 1995). This restriction can be theoretical-
ly justified because younger men and women, who generally
are not yet confronted with the care for little children, are
likely to respond similarly to the question whether women
and men are equally suited to raise little children, whereas
older people may respond differently depending on their ex-
periences regarding family formation and parenthood. In the
Netherlands, the average age at which couples expect their
first child lies around 29 years (Statistics Netherlands 2017).
Previous studies indeed showed that support for gender egal-
itarianism decreases after marriage, and after the birth of the
first child (Baxter et al. 2015; Corrigall and Konrad 2007).
Moreover, models, in which we separately analyzed the
influence of cohort- and period-specific educational expan-
sion, secularization, and feminization of the labor force while
controlling for age (see Table 1s in the online supplement),
showed that the older people are, the less they support gender
egalitarianism, starting from their mid-thirties. People aged 16
to 29 years-old seem not to differ in their support for gender
egalitarianism (see Fig. 4s in the online supplement), provid-
ing statistical support for a restriction on age. We therefore
collapsed the age dummies for respondents aged between 16
and 29 into one reference category, and we included all other
age dummies in our models to control for age effects. This
allowed us to analyze the influence of our contextual charac-
teristics simultaneously in Models 1a and 1b, while control-
ling for age. Because the structure of the population may
change with respect to individual characteristics that dispose
people toward more support for gender egalitarianism, we
included the individual characteristics in Model 2a and 2b to
account for compositional differences.
Results
Support for Gender Egalitarianism over Time
Figure 1 shows the trend in support for gender egalitarianism
for men and women in the Netherlands over time. The average
level of support for gender egalitarianism among men in-
creased from 2.5 in 1979 to almost 2.8 in 1996 (on a scale
from 1 to 5). Women’s support for gender egalitarianism is
higher and increased somewhat stronger from 2.8 in 1979 to
3.4 in 1996. Between 1997 and 2002, however, the trend
reversed slightly and stabilized after 2002.
Contributions to the Upward Trend in Support
for Gender Egalitarianism
Table 2 shows the multivariate results from regression analy-
ses including period- and cohort-specific contextual character-
istics simultaneously, controlled for age. Models 1a and 1b
demonstrate that socialization in times of a higher average
educational level in the population during people’s emerging
adult years exerts a substantial positive and significant influ-
ence on men’s (b = .42, p < .001) and women’s (b = .92,
p < .001) support for gender. For example, women socialized
in times of the highest average level of education in Dutch
society (3.78) score on average 2.40 points higher (on a scale
from 1 to 5) on the measure of gender egalitarianism as com-
pared to women socialized when the average educational level
in the Netherlands was at its lowest point (1.17)—calculation:
(3.78–1.17) * .92 = 2.40. The standardized coefficients indi-
cate that the influence of cohort-specific educational expan-
sion is twice as strong for women (β = .43) as for men
(β = .21). The difference between the regression coefficients
for men and women is significant (z = −3.96, p < .001). This
provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 1a. Exposure to a
higher average educational level in society at a specific his-
torical moment in time (i.e., in times of the survey year) has an
additional positive influence on both men’s (b = .26, p = .01;
β = .05) and women’s (b = .44, p < .001; β = .08) support for
gender egalitarianism, although the standardized coefficients
show that these effects are less strong as compared to the
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influence of educational expansion during emerging adult-
hood. The effect is not significantly stronger for women than
for men (z = −1.26, p = .21). Thus, we find partial support for
Hypothesis 1b.
Models 1a and 1b show that socialization in times of higher
shares of non-religious people during people’s emerging adult
years has a small yet significant influence on men’s support
for gender egalitarianism (b = .05, p < .001; β = .09), whereas
such effect is absent for women. This suggests that Hypothesis
2a is only partially supported. Exposure to higher shares of
non-religious people in society at a specific historical moment
in time (i.e., in times of the survey year) exerts a small signif-
icant influence on women’s support for gender egalitarianism
(b = .07, p < .001; β = .08), but not on men’s. Hence,
Hypothesis 2b also seems only partially supported.
Contrary to our expectation, socialization in times of higher
female labor force participation during emerging adulthood is
related to significantly lower levels of support for gender egal-
itarianism among men (b = −.12, p < .001; β = −.04) and
women (b = −.20, p < .001; β = −.07). This would lead to a
rejection of Hypothesis 3a. Yet, Dutch women’s participation
on the labor market remained rather stable for a long period,
and even declined during the first half of the 1950s. Only since
then, people in the Netherlands started to be exposed to rising
female labor force participation.
Model 1a and 1b show a negative effect of period-specific
female labor force participation for both men (b = −.16,
p < .001; β = −.08) and women (b = −.31, p < .001; β =
−.14), indicating that exposure to working women in society
at a specific historical moment in time (i.e., in times of the
survey year) also reduces people’s support for gender egalitar-
ianism. Additional analyses showed that this effect of period-
specific labor force participation was positive when analyzed
in a model without educational expansion (see Table 1s in the
online supplement), but the effect turned negative (but
remained significant) once the level of educational expansion
was taken into account. This may be due to the high correla-
tion between educational expansion and female labor force
participation (the correlation matrix is presented in Table 2s
in the online supplement). Hence, this finding should be
interpreted with caution.
Table 2 also presents a coefficient which summarizes the
effects of all age dummies in the model. This so-called Sheaf-
coefficient is to be interpreted as a standardized regression
coefficient and is always positive (Heise 1972). To ascertain
the direction of the age effect, we plotted the b-coefficients of
all age dummies (see Fig. 5s in the online supplement). The
results show that the older men are, the less they support
gender egalitarianism, whereas there is no significant age ef-
fect for women. Model 1 explains 10.7% of the variance
among men and 12.5% among women.
In Models 2a and 2b in Table 2, individual characteristics
are taken into account to control for compositional differences
in the structure of the population. The results show that the
influences of historical and contemporary societal circum-
stances on gender egalitarianism remain present once
accounted for people’s structural positions in society. The es-
timates of educational expansion and secularization become
slightly smaller, indicating that a small part of these contextual
effects is due to changes in the composition of the population
with respect to the individual characteristics. The negative
influence of period-specific female labor force participation
becomes somewhat stronger for both men and women once
the individual characteristics are taken into account. This sug-
gests that shifts in the population composition, for a small part,




























Fig. 1 Trends in support for
gender egalitarianism for men and
women, 1979–2006. The source
for these data is cultural changes
in the Netherlands 1979–2006;
n = 26,004
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on the labor market. The individual-level characteristics in
Model 2a and 2b indicate that support for gender egalitarian-
ism is stronger among higher educated people, people who
attend church less than once a week, non-religious people,
full-time and part-time working men and women, men
working in the household, and when there are no children
present in the household. The variance explained by our final
model amounts to 13.7% for men and 17.5% for women.
To summarize, people who are exposed to a higher average
educational level in society, particularly during their emerging
Table 2 Unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients of cohort-specific and period-specific contextual characteristics on support for gender
egalitarianism
Men (n = 12,146) Women (n = 13,858)
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
Ba β Ba β Ba β Ba β
Intercept 2.83*** 2.40*** 3.15*** 2.52***
Cohort-specific
Educational expansion .42*** .21 .38*** .18 .92*** .43 .78*** .36
Secularization (/10) .05*** .09 .04*** .08 −.01 −.02 −.02 −.03
Female LFP (/10) −.12** −.04 −.09* −.03 −.20*** −.07 −.17*** −.06
Period-specific
Educational expansion .26** .05 .20* .04 .44*** .08 .41*** .07
Secularization (/10) .01 .01 −.01 −.01 .07*** .08 .04** .05
Female LFP (/10) −.16** −.08 −.21*** −.10 −.31*** −.14 −.39*** −.18
Age (16 to 29 years = ref.)b 1.00** .10 1.00** .10 1.00 .06 1.00 .08
Individual controls
Educational attainment (primary = ref.) .12 .17
Primary vocational .03 .20***
Lower secondary .17*** .35***
Secondary vocational .14*** .47***
Upper secondary .31*** .53***
Bachelor’s or equivalent .31*** .62***
Master’s or equivalent .40*** .69***
Church attendance (once a week = ref.) .05 .06
Once a fortnight .13* .24***
Once a month .20*** .14***
Less than once a month .14*** .15***
Never .15*** .20***
No church member (yes = ref.) .20*** .08 .21*** .09
Socio-economic position (full-time = ref.) .04 .06
Part-time employment .14** .07*
Unemployed .00 .01
Household labor .26* −.10**
Pensioned .06 −.08
In education .07 .02
Other employment position .11 −.05
Children in the household (no children = ref.) −.11*** .05 −.09*** .04
Variance explained 10.7% 13.7% 12.5% 17.5%
Model 1 controlled for age (with age categories 16–29 collapsed into one category); Model 2 controlled for age (with age categories 16–29 collapsed into
one category) and individual-level characteristics. Source of these data is Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979–2006; n = 26,004
a Coefficients in bold indicate a significant difference (p < .05, two-tailed) between men and women (see Paternoster et al. 1998)
b To save space, we calculated one standardized coefficient (β) summarizing the effect for all dummy categories of age, with age categories 16–29
collapsed into one category (Heise 1972). The b-coefficients of all age dummies are presented in Fig. 5s in the online supplement
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
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adult years, support gender egalitarianism more, independent
of their own social position. This pattern supports Hypotheses
1a and 1b, although it is only the socialization effect that is
stronger for women than for men. Being socialized in a more
secular society increases men’s, but not women’s support for
gender egalitarianism, which only partly supports Hypothesis
2a. On the contrary, women who were exposed to higher
shares of non-religious people in a specific time period
showed more support for gender egalitarianism, over and
above their own level of religiosity, but this relationship was
not found among men. This pattern confirms Hypothesis 2b,
although for women only. Finally, socialization in times of
higher female labor force participation did not have the ex-
pected positive influence on support for gender egalitarianism,
and people who have been exposed to larger shares of
employed women in society seem to support gender egalitar-
ianism less once accounting for the level of educational ex-
pansion in society. This pattern contradicts Hypothesis 3a and
3b. Of all characteristics in the model, educational expansion
during emerging adulthood was found to be the most impor-
tant indicator of support for gender egalitarianism.
Additional Analyses
Because our dependent variable is an ordinal outcome mea-
sure, we performed an additional analysis of the final model
using an ordinal logistic regression procedure (polytomous
universal models or PLUM in SPSS) as a robustness check.
The results are highly similar to the outcomes of our linear
regression model (see Table 3s in the online supplement). We
also analyzed the contextual influence of gender-specific ed-
ucational expansion and secularization onmen’s and women’s
support for gender egalitarianism. For example, we analyzed
whether the rise of men’s educational levels in society influ-
enced women’s support for gender egalitarianism (see
Table 4s in the online supplement), and vice versa (see
Table 5s in the online supplement). These analyses do not alter
our conclusions, with the exception that exposure to higher
educated women in society in times of the survey year has no
significant influence on men’s support for gender egalitarian-
ism.Moreover, we analyzed the final model excluding respon-
dents still in their late adolescence and preadult years (be-
tween 16 and 20 years). This analysis yielded highly similar
results (see Table 6s in the online supplement).
Lastly, we lacked information about the province in which
respondents lived during their impressionable years. Because
higher educated respondents are more likely to have moved
between provinces during the transition to adulthood (most
notably to attend a university), we may have overestimated
the cohort effect among higher educated respondents. As a
robustness check, we ran our model on a selection of respon-
dents excluding tertiairy educated respondents (those with a
Bachelor’s or Master’s degree). The results are highly similar,
with the exception that the effects among men became slightly
smaller and the (already small and marginally significant) ef-
fects of cohort-specific female labor force participation and
period-specific educational expansion become non-
significant (see Table 7s in the online supplement). This sug-
gests that we may have slightly overestimated the cohort ef-
fects among men, although we believe that our overall con-
clusions remain valid.
Discussion
In the present study, we aimed to answer the question to what
extent changes in the historical and contemporary societal
context have contributed to the trend toward stronger support
for gender egalitarianism among men and women in the
Netherlands. Using data from 16 waves of nationally repre-
sentative surveys collected in the Netherlands between 1979
and 2006, we showed that the liberalizing trend toward greater
gender egalitarianism that has been found in a wide range of
countries (e.g., Cotter et al. 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003;
Lee et al. 2007) was also present in the Netherlands.
We empirically analyzed the influence of three important
and widely theorized societal developments that have taken
place in many countries over the past decades, including the
Netherlands: educational expansion, secularization, and the
rise of female labor force participation. Whereas previous re-
search mainly focused on temporal indicators of birth cohort
and time period to explain the rise in support for gender egal-
itarianism over time, we used contextual measures of these
three developments as indicators of the societal context during
the respondents’ emerging adult years and in specific histori-
cal times when the survey was held. In this way, we offered a
closer look into the black box of why people living and grow-
ing up in different times vary in their support for gender
egalitarianism.
We showed that changes in the societal context in which
people have grown up and live contributed to the upward
trend in support for gender egalitarianism. Of the three expla-
nations we tested, educational expansion proved the most im-
portant societal development that contributed to the upward
trend. The cohort-specific effect of educational expansion was
particularly strong, which suggests that people in their emerg-
ing adult impressionable years are especially susceptible to the
societal climate, providing support for the socialization per-
spective (Mannheim 1952). That is, due to educational expan-
sion, subsequent cohorts have been socialized in a more
egalitarian-normative climate, which has induced support for
egalitarianism regarding the care for little children among
men, and especially among women. Exposure to such a cli-
mate exerts an additional influence on people’s support for
gender egalitarianism, independent of their own social posi-
tion (Alwin and McCammon 2003). Additionally, although
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the contribution of secularization is modest, increased shares
of secular individuals in Dutch society during people’s emerg-
ing adult years have promoted some support for gender egal-
itarianism among men, whereas a higher share of secular in-
dividuals in the year preceding the survey positively influ-
enced women’s support for gender egalitarianism. A possible
explanation for this differential finding is that men are, in
general, less religious than women are and leave the church
at younger ages. Moreover, it is argued that religious sociali-
zation differs between men and women (Trzebiatowska and
Bruce 2012). As a consequence, men may be more impres-
sionable to secular influences in the social context during
emerging adulthood than are women.
In contrast to our hypotheses, we found that exposure to the
rise of female labor force participation could not in itself ex-
plain the upward trend in support for gender egalitarianism,
that is, not independently from educational expansion. Given
that women’s labor force participation in the Netherlands
remained stable at a rather low level during the first half of
the twentieth century and only started to rise substantially
since the late 1980s, many Dutch cohorts had been exposed
to low levels of female labor force participation during
emerging adulthood. Kraaykamp (2002) also observed high
levels of female labor force participation in people’s pre-adult
years to be related to more conservative attitudes toward pre-
marital and extramarital sexuality in the Netherlands.
Moreover, we found that people who are exposed to higher
rates of female labor force participation during later periods
support gender egalitarianism less, after accounting for the
level of educational expansion. Hence, the positive influence
of female labor force participation may be entirely driven by
the expansion of educational levels in society. Given the high
correlation between educational expansion and female labor
force participation, however, this result should be interpreted
with caution.
Alternatively, a theoretical explanation may be proposed.
As argued in previous research (see Cotter et al. 2011), the
increased participation of women in the labor market has pos-
sibly evoked a discussion in society about motherhood and
who should care for children when women work (Damaske
2013). This argument may as well apply to the Dutch context.
Although support for mothers’ employment is high in the
Netherlands (Merens and Van den Brakel 2014) and views
toward men’s and women’s (natural) roles concerning the care
for little children have become increasingly egalitarian, a
strong motherhood ideology—with the mother seen as pri-
marily responsible for the child’s well-being—has long been
present in the Netherlands, originating from its strong
Christian tradition and emphasized by the government as
women’s contribution to the rebuilding of the country after
the Second World War (Knijn 1994). With women’s rising
education and labor force participation, this motherhood ide-
ology may have become more culturally salient (Douglas and
Michaels 2005; Hays 1996). For example, Damaske (2013, p.
441) argued that Bthe tension between rising workforce par-
ticipation and intensive mothering, …appears resolved not
through a reduction in mothering efforts, but through a dis-
course that emphasizes conformity to goodmothering ideals.^
In a context in which women’s employment becomes more
common, women (and especially working mothers) may
adopt more traditional views on childcare responsibilities as
a strategy to legitimize their lower commitment to their careers
and/or their higher involvement with childcare and household
tasks as compared to men (Johnston and Swanson 2006).
Moreover, increased labor force participation in the
Netherlands does not necessarily reflect an increasingly egal-
itarian societal discourse. About three-quarters of Dutch wom-
en in paid labor work part-time, and the majority of women
works in traditionally female sectors such as education and
care (Merens and Van den Brakel 2014). In addition, full-
timeworking women in the Netherlands generally spend more
time on household tasks and childcare than men do (Merens
and Van den Brakel 2014). Hence, women’s increased partic-
ipation in the labor force has not yet been met with symmet-
rical changes in men’s position in the public and private do-
main (England 2010). Unfortunately, the available data did
not allow a distinction between part-time and full-time em-
ployment of women. This may be an important contribution
to the present study, especially in the context of the
Netherlands. Future research should further explore the role
of female labor force participation—and mother’s employ-
ment in particular—for explaining trends in public support
for gender egalitarianism, taking into account occupational
segregation and part-time employment.
Lastly, in line with previous research (Dotti Sani and
Quaranta 2017), we found that the influence of changes in
the societal context was generally stronger for women than
for men. Young women appear the forerunners in the process
toward more gender egalitarianism, which signifies their
greater interest in promoting gender equality (Bolzendahl
and Myers 2004). Notwithstanding, men’s support for gender
egalitarianism also has benefited from the rise of societal ed-
ucational levels and secularism during their emerging adult
years.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Several limitations and directions for future research should
be discussed. First, only one item in the data was suited to
indicate changes in support for gender egalitarianism in the
Netherlands over a longer period of time. Although gender
egalitarianism consists of various dimensions (Davis and
Greenstein 2009), we could only study one dimension related
to the raising of little children. We thus may have sketched an
incomplete picture of changes in gender ideology in the
Netherlands. Yet, the trend in this measure of gender
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egalitarianism is highly comparable to trends in other mea-
sures of gender egalitarianism that have been found in various
studies (e.g., Cotter et al. 2011; Pepin and Cotter 2018; Shu
andMeagher 2017). To what extent the indicators studied here
also contributed to trends in other measures of gender egali-
tarianism remains a question for future research.
Second, we could not explain why support for gender egal-
itarianism temporarily reversed in the Netherlands in the late
1990s, despite continuing educational expansion, seculariza-
tion, and rising female labor force participation. Yet, this find-
ing is highly consistent with a reversal of the trend during the
same period in other parts of the world (e.g., in the United
States: Cotter et al. 2011; Shu and Meagher 2017; Australia:
Van Egmond et al. 2010), in particular with regard to attitudes
about the role of men and women in the family (Pepin and
Cotter 2018). This suggests that a rather universal develop-
ment that is not limited to a specific national context may
explain the stalled gender revolution in the 1990s. For exam-
ple, Shu and Meagher (2017) found that a rise of men’s over-
work partially accounted for the stagnation in Americans’
gender attitudes. Such a rise in men’s overwork may have also
taken place in the Netherlands, but it remains to be seen
whether this explanation holds in the Dutch context.
Another possible explanation is that rising female labor force
participation has induced an essentialist counter-reaction in
the family domain (Cotter et al. 2011). Whether progress of
women’s positions in the public domain indeed produces re-
sistance to egalitarianism in the private domain (Pepin and
Cotter 2018) needs further investigation.
Third, absence of information on the province in which
respondents lived after 2006 hindered the inclusion of contex-
tual data for more recently interviewed respondents.
Moreover, respondents were not asked in which province they
had lived during their emerging adult years. As a conse-
quence, we could not exactly determine the geographical con-
text of the respondents’ emerging adulthood because theymay
have moved in the years between their youth and the moment
of the interview. This is a serious limitation, which we are
unfortunately unable to resolve. Yet, only 17% of residential
mobility takes place between provinces (Statistics
Netherlands 2018), and we have shown that our conclusions
are fairly robust. We also lacked information on the employ-
ment status of the respondents’ mother and partner, which
both may affect people’s support for gender egalitarianism.
In addition, fathers’ part-time work and involvement in the
family during people’s, and especially men’s, emerging adult
years may also influence their support for the statement that
women and men are equally suited to raise little children.
Studies that aim to explain trends in gender egalitarianism
may benefit from including other indicators of socialization
at different levels, such as the family or the neighborhood.
Lastly, our study is limited to three contextual indicators of
historical societal circumstances due to the lack of other
contextual measures going back to the early adult years of
the older cohorts in the data. Previous studies have argued
that, among others, rising employment of married mothers,
increased divorce rates, declining fertility, and the emergence
of women’s movements may have advanced public support
for gender egalitarianism (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks
and Bolzendahl 2004; Cotter et al. 2011; Inglehart and Norris
2003; Lee et al. 2007; Pampel 2011; Shorrocks 2016). Family
policies may also play a role in changing public views on
gender egalitarianism. Unfortunately, it is not possible to di-
rectly test the influence of these developments because such
data are not available in the Netherlands at the level of prov-
inces. Future research could take more historical and contem-
porary contextual factors into account, although such data are
scarce, if available at all.
Practice Implications
Gender equality, particularly in the field of education, has
been high on the policy agenda in the Netherlands.
Emancipation policies have been primarily aimed at increas-
ing girls’ participation rates and advancement to higher levels
of education, and they have successfully done so over the past
decades (Van Hek et al. 2015). By increasing women’s edu-
cational levels, these policies have secondarily also propelled
support for gender egalitarianism, which in turn may advance
girls’ and women’s educational and occupational opportuni-
ties even further. This suggests that progress in one domain
may spillover to other domains of gender equality.
However, it seems that women have reacted more strongly
to changes in the normative climate than men have, given
women’s stronger interest in adopting gender egalitarian atti-
tudes and/or because emancipation policies in the Netherlands
have been mainly directed at girls and women. Moreover,
women’s increased educational and occupational participation
has not yet been matched with men’s equal involvement in the
household (Merens and Van den Brakel 2014). Nonetheless,
our findings showed that men also adopt more gender egali-
tarian attitudes in response to changes in the societal context.
Promoting an emancipatory societal context therefore has the
potential to further enhance gender equality.
Conclusion
Our study highlights that the societal normative climate to
which people are exposed, especially during their early adult
years, plays an important role in shaping their current views
on gender egalitarianism. Promoting educational levels within
the population seems to have far-reaching benefits for advanc-
ing support for gender equality, not only for men and women
who obtain higher educational levels themselves, but also for
society writ large.
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